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research for 
the real world
Imagine a company 
that set the pay 
level of each of its 
employees and then 
gave the employees 
nearly complete 
choice over the mix.
Employee Choice Over Pay Mix 
Suppose the company set the level 
of pay and then let employees 
choose the fractions they wanted 
as guaranteed salar y, s tock 
options and at-risk bonus. The 
fraction in at-r isk bonus was 
capped at 20 percent of total 
pay and the payout was between 
0 and 2.5 times the amount put 
at-risk and was a function of indi-
vidual and group performance.
Th i s  i s  not  a  t heore t ica l 
example; it’s real! And, it is interesting for a variety of 
reasons, including that it is so extreme and because the 
organization invited some researchers inside to study the 
fascinating choices made by employees.
The Company and the System
The organization that employed this pay system was 
a company in a technical sector with fewer than 1,000 
employees. The company was young, and the average age 
of employees (35) was about five years under the national 
average. The company also aggressively recruited and had 
very high average levels of compensation. So it is not neces-
sarily typical, but offers interesting learning nonetheless.
The company originally had the idea for this pay plan 
because the senior leaders reasoned that certain employees 
may value certain forms of compensation more than others. 
So, they figured, why not let the employees choose? Of 
course, offering employees some choice over their compen-
sation is not particularly new and has been discussed in 
practical and academic outlets (see, for example, John E. 
Tropman’s “The Compensation Solution,” 2001, Jossey-Bass). 
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Cafeteria and related pay plans have enjoyed varying levels 
of interest in the past decades. Such plans can be benefi-
cial because organizations can get more for their money 
if employees value differently different forms of pay. On 
the other hand, some have argued against such plans for 
a variety of reasons, including that they are more difficult 
to administer.
Did Employees Make Different Choices?
I was incredibly enthusiastic about this organization’s 
plan. They were essentially running an experiment by 
externally changing the system, and letting me and one of 
my colleagues do some evidence-based analysis of what 
followed. Craig Olson and I have a working paper on the 
topic (“Employees’ Choice of Method of Pay”). In the paper, 
we document that certain kinds of workers made quite 
different choices compared with their peers, and consider 
some potential reasons why.
We found that there is substantial variation in the choice 
of contingent pay with some workers choosing almost 
all base pay and others choosing almost entirely stock 
options. I can only touch on some of the highlights here, 
but one interesting feature is that men and women made 
substantially different choices over their method of pay. The 
bottom line is that women were much less likely to choose 
at-risk pay than men. For example, on average, women 
chose to have 91 percent of their pay in salary, 8 percent 
in stock options and only about 1 percent in at-risk bonus. 
On the other hand, on average, men chose 81 percent 
salary, 17 percent as stock options and about 2 percent in 
at-risk bonus. The findings based on gender are consistent 
with some work in psychology and behavioral economics 
relative to attitudes toward risk by gender.
We also found some evidence based on other sorts of 
demographic characteristics of the employees. For example, 
we found some evidence that younger employees, more 
experienced employees and higher-paid employees are more 
likely to allocate a larger fraction of their total compensation 
to at-risk alternatives. 
Of course, many of these characteristics could be inter-
related. For example, it turns out that during the time of 
our study, men at that company were, on average, paid 
more and had been at the company longer, making gender 
correlated with level of pay and experience. But, control-
ling for several things at once, and doing some statistical 
analysis, one result stands out among all others — in this 
firm at the time of the study women chose less risky forms 
of compensation than men.
But what does this mean? Should more companies try this 
sort of thing? Will the employees be better off? Will the 
firms be better off? Does this type of compensation plan 
put the company at any kind of risk?
An Extreme Reversal
The organization ultimately decided to switch completely 
away from the complete choice model to one in which there 
are was no choice at all — everyone was compensated, 
pretty much, only in cash. The company removed essen-
tially all benefits, but left health insurance intact, then took 
all of the resources saved and redistributed them to the 
employees in terms of higher salaries. There were a variety 
of possible reasons for this change, including that some 
employees may have been earning less than the minimum 
wage in cash and the fact that those who chose to be paid 
heavily in options may not have been perfectly educated 
on this type of pay — both potential liabilities to the orga-
nization. Another reason may have been the administrative 
burden of a plan based on employee choice.
But, I believe the biggest reason for the switch to (almost) 
all cash pay was the chief human resources officer’s (CHRO) 
belief that employees know what they value most and 
should be in the best position to decide. To this executive, 
cash compensation seemed the most efficient mechanism 
for letting employees have total choice. If an employee 
wanted child care or a gym membership or equity assets, 
he/she could buy it on his/her own. For the organization 
at that time, the CHRO believed that its employees valued 
certain things so differently that they would be better off 
with the cash, making their own choices. The company’s 
leadership team, however, decided to keep one benefit in 
addition to health-care insurance because they found the 
employees valued it much more than it cost the company 
(a benefit that I was even able to enjoy when I visited): 
free food. 
The Institute for Compensation Studies (ICS) at Cornell University 
analyzes, teaches and communicates about monetary and nonmon-
etary rewards from work, and how rewards influence individuals, 
companies, industries and economies. ICS research and leading-edge insight 
address compensation issues challenging employers and employees in today’s 
dynamic global marketplace. www.ilr.cornell.edu/ics
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